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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF 
UTAH, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
L E 0 NARD A. M 'AD S E N and 
ARDETH MADSEN, his wife, also 
known as Ardith :Madsen, 
Defendants and Respondernts, 
vs. 
BOB JEPPSEN, 
Purchaser omd Co-Respondent. 
Case No. 
7584 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an ·appeal by plaintiff from an adverse deci-
sion and order of the District Court of the Seventh 
Judicial District in and for Sanpete County, State ;of 
Utah, Hon. L. Leland Larson, Judge. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
In this action a judgment was rendered for plaintiff 
against the defendants named in th~ sum of $4,121.19, 
and a decree of foreclosure of a mortgage which was 
securi·ty for the amount of $1950.00 of said judgment 
given by defendants and covering ''Lots 1 and 2 of Block 
28, Plat "A" of Manti City Survey," in Sanpete County, 
Utah (Rec. page 21). An Order of S'ale and Certified 
copy of Decree was handed to the Sheriff of Sanpete 
County. The Sheriff noticed the sale, purportedly made 
a sale, and filed his return (Rec. I>P· 27 to 33), showing 
the property as having been sold in one parcel and for 
only the sum of $501.00 to the named purchaser. 
The plaintiff filed an application for vacation of the 
sale upon the grounds ( 1) that the sale was not made 
of the property in ·two parcels; (2) that the proceedings 
of the sheriff were irregular and he abused his discre-
tion; and (3) that the sale price accepted by the sheriff 
was grossly incommensurate to the fair market value 
of the property sold; and submit·ted therewith its bid 
of $1950.00 for the property (Rec. ptp. 24 to 26). 
After hearing on the application the Court rendered 
its decisron dated August 7, 1950, denying the applica-
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; ' 
THE EVIDENCE 
The Sheriff, Ulysses Larsen, testified that he was 
handed typewritten notices by the attorney for the Bank 
and was instructed to fix the time of sale at 11 o'clock 
A.M., which would give plenty of time for the interested 
parties to be over to ·bid on the property; the plain tiff '-s 
place of business being at Nephi, 43 miles dis taut. And 
that it was the understanding that he, the sheriff, make 
the time for sale at 11 A.M., but that he forgot. He fur-
ther testified that he never notified the attorney for, or 
any officer of, the Bank ·that the sale was set for 10 A.M. 
instead of 11 A.M. that before 11 A.M., one, Han·son, retpL. 
resenting the Bank appeared and said that he thought 
the sale was at 11 A.M. That at the time of sale the sheriff 
stated to the bidders that the property was worth wbout 
$1000.00 ( Tr. pp. 3-6). 
Witness C. H. Beal, a disinterested real estate 
broker, testified that there was a fence dividing lots 1 
and 2, and he saw it the morning he testified; that the 
improvements were on lot 1, and lot 2 was vacant; and 
that the property was worth from $1400 to $1500, market 
value (Tr. pp. 8-10). 
POINTS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL 
ON APPEAL 
The appellant relies upon the following points for a 
reversal of the decision and order appealed from: 
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POINT I. 
THAT THE SALE WAS NOT MADE OF THE PROPERTY 
IN TWO PARCELS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 69(e) 3, RESULTING IN GROSSLY 
INADEQUATE BIDS, TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE PROCEEDING BY THE SHERIFF IN FAIL-
ING TO NOTICE SALE AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK A.M., AS 
INSTRUCTED BY PLAINTIFF AND AS UNDERSTOOD BY 
PLAINTIFF AND SHERIFF, AND HI'S FAILING TO NOTIFY 
PLAINTIFF OF HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 
INSTRUCTION AND CONFORM ~WITH SUCH UNDER-
STANDING AND THEREBY PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF 
FROM BEING PRESENT, RESULTED IN GROSSLY IN-
ADEQUATE BIDS AND SALE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY, 
AND CONSTITUTED A PREJUDICIAL IRREGULARITY. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE SALE PRICE ACCEPTED BY THE SHERIFF 
WAS GROSSLY INCOMMENSURATE TO THE FAIR MAR-
KET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SOLD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE SALE WAS NOT MADE OF THE PROPERTY 
IN TWO PARCELS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 69(e) 3, RESULTING IN GROSSLY 
INADEQUATE BIDS; TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69 (e) 3 provides 
th81t when the sale is of real estate, consisting of several 
lmown lots or parcels, they must be sold se'Parately. 
The description lots 1 and 2 is indicative of there being 
two known parcels. In this case there was a fence divid-
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:I 
ing the lots; the improvements were on one lot and the 
other lot, lot 2, was vacant. To say that only one parcel 
was comprised by lots 1 and 2 would be tantrunount to 
saying tha:t a sale could not have been made of the area 
in two parcels, that it would have been necessary to have 
divided one parcel to have sold lot 1 to A and lot 2 to B. 
Section 104-55-1 U.C.A. 1943, was retained under 
the rules, and it is therein provided that in foreclosure 
the order of sale should direct the sheriff to proceed 
and sell the same according to the provisions of law 
relating to sales on ex~ution, and the rule above refer-
red to applies in this case . 
42 C.J. 200, holds: 
'' ConS'titutional or statutory directions. The 
sale must also conform to directions contained 
in a constitutional or statutory provision applic-
able to the foreclosure, as, for example, that where 
the sale is of real property and consis-ting of sev- · 
eral known lots or parcels, they must be sold 
separately * * *.'' 
Our contention is supported by Oole vs. Oanto~.n 
Mng. Co., 59 Utah 140, 202 P.ac. 830, which was a mort-
gage foreclosure. 
The plaintiff cannot be held to have waived the 
requirement of the statute or rule by not being present 
at the time of sale in that the reason it was not repre-
sented was due to excusable indavertence due to the 
mistake of the Sheriff. And, as will appear hereinafter, 
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the interests of the plaintiff creditor are taken into 
account as well as the debtors. As to the purchaser the 
rule of caveat emptor applied. 
"The rule of caveat emptor applies to pur-
chases at judicial sales, and the ·purchaser of said 
property took it subject to all the infirmities of 
the proceedings of sale." Kimball· et al. vs. Salis-
bury, et al.,.19 Utah 161 at page 177, 56 Pac. 973. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE PROCEEDING BY THE SHERIFF IN FAIL-
ING TO NOTICE SALE AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK A.M., AS 
INSTRUCTED BY PLAINTIFF AND AS UNDERSTOOD BY 
PLAINTIFF AND SHERIFF, AND HIS FAILING TO NOTIFY 
PLAINTIFF OF HIS F AlLURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 
INSTRUCTION AND CONFORM WITH SUCH UNDER-
STANDING AND THEREBY PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF 
FROM BEING PRESENT, RESULTED IN GROSSLY IN-
ADEQUATE BIDS AND SALE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY, 
AND CONSTITUTED A PREJUDICIAL IRREGULARITY. 
The Sheriff's own testimony indicates that he under-
stood plaintiff intended being present to bid at the sale. 
He stated that was given as a reason to fix the time at 
11 A.M., to give plenty of time to interested ,parties to 
be over there to bid on that property. He knew that 
he should have fixed the time of sale at 11 A.M. instead 
of 10 A.M., but he forgot. Then having failed to conform 
to the instructi·on and understanding he failed to notify 
the plaintiff of such failure. And, having failed in those 
two respects, and on receiving no bid higher than half 
of ·what he considered the property to ·be worth, and 
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·., 
kno\'.'ing plaintiff intended cOining over to bid on the 
property, he failed to exercise any discretion by post-
poning the sale until 11 A.M., which he could have done 
by a siln'Ple proclamation to that effect. 
Under U.R.C.P. 69( e) 2 it is provided: 
'·If at the tinw appointed for the sale of any 
real or personal property on-execution the officer 
shall deem it expedient and for the interests of all 
persons concerned to pos,tpone the sale for want 
of purchasers, or other sufficient cause, he may 
postpone the san1e frOin time to time * * *. '' 
The conduct of the sheriff was so irregular under 
the circumstances of this case that prejudice to the plain-
tiff cannot be doubted. It cannot be said that such con-
duct on the part of a sheriff could be expe0ted and should 
have been anticipated by plaintiff. No, the sheriff has 
a higher responsibility and duty to the Courts, litigants 
and public than to permit of such theory or rule. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE SALE PRICE ACCEPTED BY THE SHERIFF 
WAS GROSSLY INCOMMENSURATE TO THE FAIR MAR-
KET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SOLD. 
The sheriff knew that the price sold for was grossly 
incommensurate to the fair market value, because he 
announced to the bid(lers that he considered the property 
worth about one thousand dollars. The broker witness 
said it was worth fourteen to fifteen hundred dollars. 
·' Plaintiff submitted a bid with its application of $1950.00. 
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In point on the subject we submit the following 
authoritative statements: 
In State vs. Harrower (Okla.), 29 Pac. 2nd 123, the 
case of D'U!ncan vs. Eck, et al. (Okla.), 16'6 Pac. 121, 
wherein the rules applicable to ~this matter are condensed 
and crystallized, is cited and in part set out, and I quote 
therefrom: 
''As a general rule mere inadequacy of con-
sideration is not sufficient ground for setting aside 
a sheriff's sale, but all of the authorities hold 
uniformly that when gross inadequacy of con-
sideration, coupled with very slight additional cir-
cumstances, is sufficient to set aside such sale, 
and that where the consideration is so grossly in-
adequa;te as to shock the conscience of the court, 
or is very great, it is alone sufficient." '(Citing 
authorities.) 
"It is the duty of the court in confirming or 
setting aside a sheriff's sale to protect all parties 
concerned, the owners and creditors of the owners 
as well as the purchaser. 
''Whether the sale should be confirmed is a 
matter within the sound discretion of the court; 
but it is a discretion that must be exercised reason-
ably and not arbitrarily, and if abused is subject 
to review on appeal. The sale must appear ,to be 
in all essential respects fair and proper, or it will 
not be confirmed, and the simple fact that con-
firmation would sacrifice the interests of those 
entitled to the protection of the court is sufficient 
ground for a refusal to confirm. The court will 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I· I 
not, however, be astute to find objections, and if 
there is no eYidence of unfairness, deception, or 
impropriety the sale is properly confirmed.'' 
In State vs. Ha.rrower, supra, the case of F<owler vs. 
Krutz, 38 Pac. 808, is cHed and the syllabus therefrom 
quoted as follo·ws : 
''Inadequacy of price, taken alone, is seldom, 
if ever, sufficient to authorize the setting aside of 
a sheriff's sale; yet great inadequacy of price is 
a circumstance which courts will always regard 
with suspicion, and iri such case slight additional 
circums·tances only are required to authorize the 
setting aside of the sale. * * * .And in the present 
case it is held that the circumstances under which 
the sale was made, and the irregularities therein, 
in connection wi-th the gross inadequacy of price, 
are sufficient to sustain the ruling of the court in 
setting aside the sale.'' 
One further quotation which is applicable to the 
maHer before the Court taken from Suring State Barnk 
vs. Giese, et al. (Wis.), 246 N.W. 556, 85 .A.L.R. 1477, at 
page 1479: 
''The court may decline to confirm the sale 
where the bid is substantially inadequate. While 
it has ·been said that mere inadequacy of con-
sideration is not a ground for setting aside a fore-
closure sale, this rule has been rather carefully 
circumscribed by the court. In Griswold vs. Bar-
den ('\Vis.), 130 N.W. 952, 953, this court speaking 
through ~[r. Chief Justice Winslow, said: 'It has 
been said by this court that iot is settled practice 
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of courts of equity to refuse a resale for mere 
inadequacy of consideration, and that this court 
will not depart from that rule where no uther 
cause exists.' :Meehan vs. Blodgett, Wis. 57 N.W. 
291. This is doubtless a corre.ct statement of the 
rule, but it seems from the argument in the pres-
ent case that it may be easily misunderstood. It 
must be strictly confined to cases where there is 
abbolutely no fact appearing, except that the price 
is inadequate. Whenever other facts appear, such 
as mistake, misapprehension, or inadvertence on 
the part of the interested parties or of intending 
bidders, as a result of which it seems ·to the court 
the failure to obtain a fair and adequate price for 
the property was due in whole or in part to such 
mistake, misapprehension, or inadvertence, the 
court will readily refuse to approve the sale. No 
fraud is necessary ·to justify the court in so with-
holding its a:pproval. The question simply is, Is 
the sale under all the circumstances one of which 
the court in justice to all parties should approve~'' 
The right of the creditor to realize as much from 
the value uf the property is of as great a dignity as the 
right of the debtor to obtain a fair value and credit for 
the proper,ty sold. If it were the debtor applying under 
similar circumstances and factual matters the Court 
would not hesitate to set aside the sale. 
The writers do not intend ~to impute malfeasance on 
the part of the sheriff in this instance. But will it be 
wise on the part of this Court to affirm the dereliction 
on the part of this sheriff and set a precedent 1 
10 
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In this case we have as argument and grounds for 
reversal not just one proposition, but three: (1) Failure 
to sell the two parcels of real estate in two separate 
parcels; ( :2) Prejudicial irregularities on the part of th~ 
sheriff; and ( 3) Gross inadequacy of the sale price. 
So, the ques.tion simply is, ''Is the sale under all 
the circumstances one of which the court in justice to all 
parties should approve 1 '' Suri.ng State Bank vs. Giese, 
et al., supra. 
'V e submit that the decision and order appealed 
from should be reversed and the court make an order 
setting aside and vacating the purported sale S'O made 
and directing that the bid of plaintiff be ac,Cepted and 
approved. 
Respectfully su•bmitted, 
P. N. ANDERSON, 
EKSAYN ANDERSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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